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Abstract 
7KHµVRFLDOLQYHVWPHQWSHUVSHFWLYH¶ arguably represents the very latest justification for social 
policy to guide the development of the economy and society in the twenty-first century.  As 
yet, its history remains largely unexplored.  This article aims to place it in a wider framework 
by exploring theoretical considerations over a longer timescale, drawing on early observations 
of founding social theorists on social investment including R. H. Tawney, some of the thinking 
of T. H. Marshall as well as the radical political economies of welfare in the 1970s and 80s.  
The article links HPHUJLQJLGHDVDERXWµVRFLDOLQYHVWPHQW¶ to earlier µproductivist¶ traditions 
within social policy which informed the development of Western industrial welfare states; and 
shows how the productivist focus had been lost by the 1980s and 1990s with a consequent 
narrowing of focus to the redistributive role of the tax and transfer system.  A longue durée 
SHUVSHFWLYHEULQJV LQWR VKDUS IRFXV WKH µUHGLVFRYHU\¶RI WKHpotential of µVRFLDO LQYHVWPHQW¶
social policy in the closing years of the 20th century, as welfare states began to adapt to the 
new social and economic conditions of the post-industrial era.  Our aim is not to present a 
systematic history of social policy and economic thought.  It is rather exploratory, seeking to 
show from some of the key thinkers and movements in the British tradition important 
FRQWH[WXDO HOHPHQWV IRU XQGHUVWDQGLQJ µVRFLDO LQYHVWPHQW¶ WKDW appear to have been lost in 
social policy debates over recent decades. 
Keywords: social investment, inclusive growth, social policy history 
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Introduction 
Despite growing interest in the diffusion of µsocial investment¶ ideas in social policy, we find 
that to-date, scholars have not given enough serious attention to the history of the idea (Béland 
and Petersen 2014). Many, quite rightly, see social investment as a very recent development in 
social policy (e.g. Van Kersbergen and Hemerijck 2012), but few have reflected on the 
genealogy (cf. Morel et al. 2015).  One recent text in the field highlighted the need for the 
social investment approach to be better integrated with economics (Morel et al. 2012).  Noting 
the disconnect between social investment and economic neoliberalism, it pointed to the earlier 
ideas of Keynes and the Myrdals as suggesting the kind of new economic thinking which is 
needed today.  This article is an exploration of some of the key historical antecedents of the 
contemporary µsocial investment perspective¶Jenson 2010) in social policy. 
In the discussion we attempt to explain why the history of social investment within social 
policy has largely gone unexplored and highlight some of the consequences of this; second, we 
show why the µUHGLVFRYHU\¶ RI WKH µVRFLDO LQYHVWPHQW¶ in social policy matters for the 
development of the discipline.  Our exploration focusses on the British tradition (not confined 
to British authors but including some non-British thinkers influential on that tradition).  We 
begin with the period of welfare ideologies just prior to the neoliberal ascendancy, then move 
to consider the foundations of the welfare state through the ideas of T. H. Marshall before 
finally examining the pre-welfare state social policy world exemplified by R. H. Tawney. From 
a long durée perspective (see for example Powell¶V2003 longue durée study of µquasi-markets¶ 
in British health policy for Social Policy and Administration) then we find that far from an 
early twentieth century novelty the idea of social investment has always been a foundational 
idea in social policy. 
 
The µsocial investment perspective¶ in social policy 
WKLOHWKHODQJXDJHRIµVRFLDOLQYHVWPHQWDFURVVWKHOLIHFRXUVH¶(e.g. Hemerijck, 2015; Kvist 
2015) now informs policy platforms around the world, the theoretical underpinnings of the new 
economic model remain fragile.  For the most part this fragility stems from a confusion 
surrounding the relationship of welfare to economic policy in the new regime.  Thus, critics of 
the social investment approach have presented it as a subordination of social policy goals to 
the market economy; while its champions have positioned it as an element of a µpost-neoliberal 
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FRQVHQVXV¶ aimed at reconnecting markets to social goals.  A central issue in these debates 
concerns the productive or economic contribution of social policy.  It was precisely the claim 
to its productive value which set the social investment agenda apart from welfare state 
defenders on the one hand and neoliberal economists on the other.  While the claim could 
muster support from more heterodox contemporary economic theory (e.g., endogenous growth 
theory) it appeared quite novel within social policy itself. 
Since its emergence around the turn of the century a persistent criticism of the social 
investment agenda by defenders of the welfare state has been that it subordinates social goals 
to the market economy.  While this is not the place for a detailed account of the politics of 
µsocial investment¶ DQGWKHµWKLUGZD\¶clarity around the concepts is important. It should be 
noted that the emergent social investment agenda of state-led investment in human capital 
became a defining feature of µWKLUG ZD\¶ SROLWLFDO WKRXJKW in the late-1990s. That market 
competition necessities a constant intervention on the part of the state WR SURPRWH µVRFLDO
MXVWLFH¶DQGµHTXDOLW\RIRSSRUWXQLW\¶LQWKHPDUNHWwas emphasised by µWKLUGZD\¶ theorists 
such as Anthony Giddens. In fact, Giddens (1998, p.99) originally coined the µVRFLDO
investment state¶ WHUP to show how welfare systems and investment in human capital were 
relevant to economic productivity. Nevertheless, there were significant differences of emphasis 
in social investment perspectives, particularly in the account of the protective functions of 
welfare.  On the one hand Giddens (1998), accepted right wing critiques of µpassive¶ welfare 
expenditures, advocating strong labour market attachment policies µZRUN-ILUVW¶ to break 
µZHOIDUH GHSHQGHQF\¶.  On the other hand, Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Duncan Gallie, Anton 
Hemerijck and John Myles (2002) maintained that a strong economy requires a strong welfare 
state and social protection is of paramount importance even in the most productivist of welfare 
states (see further discussion, Deeming and Smyth 2015). 
Ruth Lister (2002, 2003, 2004) was a prominent early critic of the social investment agenda 
associating it ZLWK D µWKLUG ZD\¶ SROLWLFV that was about fiscal austerity and equality of 
opportunity rather than equality here and now.  Later, writing with Dobrowolsky, she gave an 
account of the then mature social investment agenda of New Labour showing how it had 
cleared a path between µNew Right¶ and µOld Left¶ interests and ideas and captured the middle 
ground (Dobrowolsky and Lister 2008).  At the same time, they conclude that social policy still 
UHPDLQHGWKHµKDQGPDLGHQRIHFRQRPLFSROLF\¶ (p.132).  Hartley Dean (2004) was another who 
thought that the human capital investment SROLF\ZDVRYHUO\IRFXVVHGRQµWKHUROHRIWKHFLWL]HQ
as an economic rather than a social actor and as a competitive individual rather than as a 
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FRRSHUDWLYHVRFLDOEHLQJ¶.  A second more limited critique acknowledged the legitimacy of 
social investment but saw it as crowding out traditional redistributive social protection.  These 
kinds of critique reached their fullest expression in the article by Brian Nolan (2013) asking 
µ:KDWXVHLV³VRFLDOLQYHVWPHQW´"¶1RODQ¶VQXDQFHGDQDO\VLVKLJKOLJKWVWKHQHDULPSRVVLELOLW\
of separating out social policies which are about investment from those about consumption ± 
unemployment benefits as much as education has a dual social and economic function.  But, 
of course, this LVQRUHDVRQQRWWRWDNHLQWRDFFRXQWWKHLUSURGXFWLYHYDOXHDQG1RODQ¶Vmain 
case against the social investment approach is rather that an emphasis on justification in terms 
of µmainstream¶ economic arguments will diminish the case based on social values (Anton 
Hemerijck, 2012 expresses similar concerns). 
Importantly, Nolan is not completely opposed to a concern with the economic dimension of 
social policies.  As with the earlier critics his concern is with the narrow, orthodox economics 
from which he thinks the best that social policy advocates can hope for LV WKDW µVRPH
UHFDOLEUDWLRQ RI ZHOIDUH VSHQGLQJ ZLOO EH HPEUDFHG LQ D FRQWH[W RI RYHUDOO UHWUHQFKPHQW¶ 
Nevertheless, he does allow that in some accounts of social investment (e.g. Evers and 
Guillemard 2012) there is an understanding that the goal of economic growth can include an 
RULHQWDWLRQWRJUHDWHUµVRFLDOLQFOXVLRQDQGWKHUHDOL]DWLRQRIVRFLDOULJKWV¶IRUH[DPSOH, where 
it contributes to a broad based, employment rich rather than narrow pattern of economic 
development. 
This opinion suggests that for Nolan and many of the critics of the social investment 
approach, the chief stumbling block has been the understanding that it has been a misguided 
DWWHPSW DW µWDNLQJ RQ WKH HFRQRPLVWV RQ WKHLU RZQ JURXQG and allowing them to frame the 
GHEDWH¶  In fact, when we turn to the advocates of the approach we find that they see it as 
actually moving beyond the neoliberal economic paradigm.  As Morel et al. (2015, p.137) 
ZULWHµpast social policy approaches have been integrated with economic theories of different 
kinds¶.  This suggests we need to go beyond Keynesian and neo-classical economic theories 
DQGDQFKRUWKHVRFLDOLQYHVWPHQWDSSURDFKLQDQHZHFRQRPLFPRGHO¶ It would seem then that 
in the earlier contest over the social investment approach the protagonists have largely been 
talking past each other.  The nub of a new consensus is the need for a new economic model. 
An intriguing feature of the European social policy literature is the extent to which thinking 
about social investment occurs largely within the shadow of austerity economics and\or, the 
German model (Vandenbroucke and Vleminckx 2011).  In particular, we see little of that wind 
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of renewal found in the countries of Latin America and Asia.  European scholars seem scarcely 
to have engaged with the new economic model which has been developing around the emerging 
concept of µinclusive growth¶ that allows people to contribute to and benefit from economic 
growth (see Smyth and Buchanan 2013; Hasmath 2015).  As Midgley (2015) writes of µVRFLDO
LQYHVWPHQWDQGLQFOXVLYHJURZWK¶µVRFLDOSROLF\ZLOOEHQHILWIURPDJUHDWHUDZDUHQHVVRIWKH
international social development literature, which is almost entirely absent from the 
Eurocentric social policy discoXUVHRQWKHVXEMHFW¶ 
The concept of inclusive growth offers a policy model which responds directly to the types 
of critique of social investment by Nolan and links it to the kind of broader economic model 
sought by Morel et al. Among the international financial agencies, the dominance of the 
µ:DVKLQJWRQFRQVHQVXV¶ LVRYHU As Vetterlein (2013, p.53) observed WKH µ%UHWWRQ:RRGV
LQVWLWXWLRQV¶FRQFHSWLRQVRIGHYHORSPHQWKDYHFKDQJHGRYHU WLPH«7KHHUVWZKLOHIRFXVRQ
economic growth as the sole precondition for development has been supplanted by a more 
holistic understanding of development that places social policies at the centre of development 
DQG SRYHUW\ UHGXFWLRQ¶  7KXV, +DVPDWK  ZULWHV RI WKH µXOWra pragmatic¶ Beijing 
consensus which has overtaken WKHµIXQGDPHQWDOLVWDGKHUHQFHWR«QHROLEHUDOLVP¶ (p.4).  The 
agenda certainly promotes traditional social protection policies as a way to ensure all share in 
the benefits of growth.  But it is equally emphatic on the productive side of social policy 
emphasising not just investments in human capability but also interventions to manage markets 
so that they ensure broad based economic participation as the basis of the welfare regime 
(Samans et al. 2015). 
The adoption of an µinclusive growth¶research agenda by the OECD (2014) in collaboration 
with the World Bank is indicative of a new international consensus around the need for an 
economic model which can promote growth, reduce inequality and ensure environmental 
sustainability (see also recent reports for the IMF (Anand et al. 2013) and the World Economic 
Forum (Samans et al. 2015) for example).  While the so-called µBeijing Consensus¶ may lack 
a grand theoretical underpinning in economics it has clearly opened a new discursive space 
within which social policy scholars in developed economies can move beyond defensive 
concerns about the social investment approach and begin thinking constructively about the new 
positive reintegration of social with economic policy. 
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Historical swings and roundabouts of productive social policy 
Reclaiming the productive dimension of social policy will be a challenge for contemporary 
social policy research.  Since the 1990s social policy has become more and more boxed in as a 
specialised study of the tax and transfer system and its effects on poverty and inequality in the 
rich countries of the OECD (Mkandawire 2011; Smyth 2015).  For example, in The Oxford 
Handbook of the Welfare State, Kuhnle and Sander (2010) associate the development of the 
welfare state with µWKHHPHUJHQFHRIVRFLDOLQVXUDQFHLQWKHFRXQWULHVRIWKH(XURSHDQVRFLDO 
FRPSOH[¶7KHDXWKRUVJUDQWWKDWWKLVPD\DSSHDUµUHODWLYHO\QDUURZ¶EXWWKLQNLWMXVWLILDEOH
because they associate foundational late nineteenth century social policy very much with the 
JURZWK RI µVRFLDO-LQVXUDQFH OLNH SROLFLHV¶  /LNHZLVH, $GHPD DQG :KLWHIRUG¶V (2010) 
FRQWHPSRUDU\LQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPSDULVRQRIZKDW WKH\FDOOµVRFLDOHIIRUW¶RUµVRFLDOVSHQGLQJ¶
focuses entirely on institutions SURYLGLQJVXSSRUWIRUSHRSOHLQµFLUFXPVWDQFHVWKDWDGYHUVHO\
DIIHFW WKHLUZHOIDUH¶(i.e. pensions, benefits, allowances etc.).  No productivist social policy 
alluded to here. 
But this type of disciplinary myopia in relation to the economy is not a usual condition.  As 
Nolan has reminded us, there was a well-developed understanding of the economic role of 
µsocial LQYHVWPHQW¶policy in the 1970s and 1980s and we will show below through the example 
of R. H. Tawney that this was also the case in the pre-welfare state period.  We also show 
through the writing of T. H. Marshall that even in the period of the welfare state¶VKLJKHVW
legitimacy, the interaction of social with economic institutions remained a key concern.  While 
each of these phases was very different in terms of context and policy priorities they should 
attune us at least to the kinds of questions that social policy researchers should have in mind 
as we look to a new integration of social with economic policy. 
 
The ideologies of welfare and social investment 
The aFDGHPLFGHEDWHVRYHUµVRFLDOLQYHVWPHQW¶ in the latter 1970s and early 80s appeared amid 
that WKHRUHWLFDO IORZHULQJ DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK WKH µLGHRORJLHV RI ZHOIDUH¶ literature which had 
followed what had been the top-down, empiricist phase focussed on the administration of the 
statutory services of the early welfare state (George and Wilding 1976; Mishra 1981; Taylor-
Gooby and Dale 1981).  At the centre of the new approach as outlined by Mishra was the 
creation RIµLGHRORJLHVRUPRGHOVRIZHOIDUH¶ZKLFKLQFRUSRUDWHG normative and explanatory 
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theory and also widened what he FDOOHGWKHµIRFXVRIDQDO\VLV¶7KHemphasis on the social 
services associated with the work of Richard M. Titmuss, he wrote, had differentiaWHG³WKH
µVRFLDO¶WRo sharply IURPWKHµHFRQRPLF¶´ (p.22).  Overcoming this dichotomy had become an 
imperative as a global economic crisis DVVRFLDWHGZLWKµVWDJIODWLRQ¶HQJXOIHGWKHZHOIDUHVWDWH
in a fiscal crisis. 
A UDQJH RI µPRGHOV¶ were then developing which included a Marxist new left and a 
monetarist neoliberal right ZLWKVHYHUDOFHQWULVWSRVLWLRQVLQEHWZHHQ$VWKHµFULVLV¶GHYHORSHG
however, centrist positions crumbled and social policy thinking about the economy polarised.  
The critical policy issue forcing the integration of social with economic analysis was 
µVWDJIODWLRQ¶ whereby traditional Keynesian stimuli to reduce unemployment had no effect as 
they were absorbed by inflation.  Claus 2IIH¶V(1984) DFFRXQWRIµVRPHFRQWUDGLFWLRQV¶RIWKH
welfare state provides a useful point of departure for exploring the radical perspectives.  The 
ZHOIDUH VWDWH KH ZULWHV KDG KDG D µPXOWL-IXQFWLRQDO FKDUDFWHU¶ DFFRPPRGDWLQJ D UDQJH RI
potentially conflicting political interests (social democratic, enlightened conservative etc.).  
Importantly, this role had been underpinned by Keynesian economics whereby the welfare state 
ZDVQRWVHHQDVDµEXUGHQLPSRVHGXSRQWKHHFRQRP\EXWDVDEXLOW-in economic and political 
stabilizer which could help to regenerate the forces of economic growth and prevent the 
HFRQRP\IURPVSLUDOOLQJGRZQZDUGLQWRGHHSUHFHVVLRQ¶ (1984, p. 148). 
With the global recession in the late 1970s however, this centre had been unable to hold.  
According to Offe, the monetarists argued that the welfare state harmed rather than helped 
PDUNHW IRUFHV DFKLHYH µVRFLDO SHDFH DQG SURJUHVV¶ (1984, p.149).  Excessive taxation and 
regulation had become disincentives to investment while welfare benefits had become 
GLVLQFHQWLYHV WR ZRUN  )RU WKH VRFLDOLVW OHIW WKH ZHOIDUH VWDWH KDG SURYHQ µLQHIIHFWLYH DQG
LQHIILFLHQW¶LQVRIDUDVLWKDGQRWHOLPLQDWHGWKHLQFRPHJDSEHWZHHQODERXUDQGFDSLWDODQGKDG
focussed on amelioration rather than prevention.  The bureaucratic form of the social services 
had proven repressive with the needy having to submit WRWKHµPRUDORUGHU¶RIVRFLHW\LQUHWXUQ
for their benefits; while more generally, WKHZRUNLQJFODVVZDVLQGRFWULQDWHGLQWRµFODVVFR-
RSHUDWLRQ¶DQGGLGQRWVHH WKDW WKHH[SDQVLRQRIµVRFLDO ULJKWV¶KDG WREHFRPSOHPHQWHGE\
JUHDWHUµZRUNHUV¶ULJKWV¶LQWKHVSKHUHRISURGXFWLRQ 
,WZDVZLWKLQWKLVSROLF\FRQWH[WWKDW2¶&RQnor (1973) developed his class analysis of public 
finance to better understand the variHGFRPSRVLWLRQDQGSXUSRVHVRIµVRFLDOLQYHVWPHQW¶)URP
his Marxist perspective he understood the state to have two basic and often contradictory 
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functions: accumulation and legitimation.  The former concerned ensuring the profitability of 
capital, the latter the maintenance of social harmony between the classes.  These functions led 
to two types of state expenditure: social capital and social expenses.  Social capital could be 
further analysed in terms of social investment and social consumption.  The first aimed at 
raising the productivity of labour and thereby the rate of profit and the latter at lowering the 
cost of reproducing labour and thereby also raising the rate of profit.  Social expenses, on the 
other hand were more directly concerned with legitimation of which the best example was the 
ZHOIDUH V\VWHP µZKLFK LV GHVLJQHG FKLHIO\ WR NHHS WKH SHDFH DPRQJ XQHPSOR\HG ZRUNHUV¶ 
(1973, p.7).  2¶&RQQRU observed that most social investments had more than one of these 
functions. 
More generally, the social investment approach allowed the left to show, as Gough (1975) 
put it, that the growing share of public spending in the post ZDUSHULRGKDGEHHQ µIDU IURP
DQWDJRQLVWLFWRSULYDWHFDSLWDODFFXPXODWLRQ¶EHFRPLQJµLQFUHDVLQJO\DQHFHVVDU\SUHUHTXLVLWH¶  
Of course, from a Marxist perspective the challenge was to show that social investment was 
about more than a means of heightening labour exploitation.  Gough (1975; and see Taylor-
Gooby and Dale 1981) notably distanced his analysis from an overly functionalist 
interpretation emphasising the reality of political agency (meaning that within welfare states 
class conflicts would be balanced differently with working class gains and losses varying 
accordingly). 
The understanding of the productive value of social policy was not confined to radical 
Marxists.  Orthodox economists ± Keynesian and otherwise ± wrote of the returns on 
investment in human capital (e.g. Mincer 1958; Schulz 1961). Andersson (2007) has traced the 
history of the concept of social policy as investment in Swedish social democratic thought from 
its origins in the late 19th century through WRWKHµWKLUGZD\¶Framed in institutionalist rather 
than structuralist economics, notably by the Myrdals in the 1930s, LWZDVEDVLFWRWKHµVWURQJ
VRFLHW\¶ PRGHO of productive welfare which persisted in Sweden through to the 1960s 
(Angresano 1997). 
Andersson shows that b\WKHHPHUJHQFHRIµWKLUGZD\¶WKLQNLQJ in Sweden in the 1980s this 
productivist orthodoxy had been displaced by DQHZZHOIDUHDJHQGDIRFXVVLQJRQWKHµVRFLDOO\
H[FOXGHG¶for whom the pattern of economic growth had become the problem rather than the 
solution and for whom social protection rather than intensified productivism seemed necessary.  
This weakening commitment to the productivist model helped pave the way for the neoliberal 
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alternative.  As Offe writes more generally of welfare states at this time, a similar disillusion 
with the post-war growth encouraged new middle class, post-materialist social movements 
VHHNLQJ D µQRQ-bureaucratic, decentralized, and egalitarian model of a self-UHOLDQW ³ZHOIDUH
VRFLHW\´¶ (1984, p.159); this disenchantment with growth increasingly left the field of 
economic policy to a resurgent neoliberalism. 
 
Can workers become gentlemen?  T. H. Marshall 
In this section we push back beyond the age of µradicalism¶ to the µgolden age¶ of the welfare 
state and in particular the thinking of T. H. Marshall.  Marshall of course was a major 
contributor to the theory of citizenship and the welfare state (Béland 2010).  Evers and 
Guillemard (2012) provide an excellent recent summary of key debates over the contemporary 
UHOHYDQFHRI0DUVKDOO¶VWKHRU\RIFLWL]HQVKLSLQFOXGLQJWKHEDODQFHRIULJKWVDQGREOLJDWLRQV
the place RI µDFWLYH FLWL]HQVKLS¶ and the relevance of Esping-$QGHUVHQ¶V DFFRXQW RI
decommodification and so on.  These matters lie outside the scope of our article.  Instead we 
pursue the question of how Marshall saw the relationship between social policy and the 
economy?  In particular, did he recognise the social investment and productivist functions of 
social policy?  
According to most of the literature we would not expect to find this as a defining feature of 
MarsKDOO¶VWKLQNLQJabout social policy.  This period is most often seen as one of neglect of the 
economy in social policy thinking.  Midgley (2015), for example, writes that pre-war concerns 
ZLWKVRFLDOLQYHVWPHQWZHUHµVXEYHUWHGE\WKHSRSXODULVDWLRQRI0DUVKDOO¶VZULWLQJVRQVRFLDO
rights DQG7LWPXVV¶VZRUNRQDOWUXLVP¶VRWKDWan historic concern with economic participation 
ZDVGLVSODFHGE\DIRFXVµLQVWHDGRQZHOIDUHWUDQVIHUVWKURXJKWKHDJHQF\RIWKHVWDWH¶Indeed, 
Midgley sees an ongoing Marshall legacy of neglect in Esping-$QGHUVHQ¶V ZRUN RQ
µdecommodification¶ (Esping-Andersen 1990), van Parijs (2015) on µbasic income¶ and 
Fitzpatrick (2004) on µpost-productivist¶ welfare. 
A full reading of how Marshall thought of the relationship of social policy to the economy 
would need to canvass his understanding of how the welfare state regime related to earlier 
µNew Liberal¶ and socialist agendas, RIKRZLWKDGFRPHWRµVXEVWLWXWHIRUVRFLDOLVP¶LQpost-
war µNew Fabianism¶ DQGµHQGRILGHRORJ\¶WKLQNing, and lastly of how it was being superseded 
in WKHµaIIOXHQWVRFLHW\¶ Such a reading would encompass the subtle changes identified by 
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scholars from WKHµHDUO\¶WRWKHµODWH¶0DUVKDOOVHH5HLVPDQ+ROPZRRG3RZHOO
2002; Rees 1995).  For our purposes it will be sufficient to identify the core ideas in what was 
a significant engagement with the relationship of social policy to the economy; albeit one which 
did neglect the productivist contribution of welfare as well as the ways in which economic 
policy needed to be integrated with welfare effort in the pursuit of social goals.  Here we revisit 
the most salient works of this engagement: the first on citizenship and social class and then the 
later writings on WKHµK\SKHQDWHGVRFLHW\¶. 
0DUVKDOO¶VZRUNCitizenship and Social Class is particularly important for our investigation 
because it takes as its central theme the question posed a half a century earlier by the economist 
$OIUHG0DUVKDOO µ7KHTXHVWLRQ LV QRWZKHWKHU DOOPHQZLOO XOWLPDWHO\EH HTXDO ± that they 
certainly will not - but whether progress may not go on steadily, if slowly, till, by occupation 
DWOHDVWHYHU\PDQLVDJHQWOHPDQ¶ (quoted in Marshall 1950, p.4).  Part of T. H. 0DUVKDOO¶V
ambition here was to show the distinctive contribution sociology could make to answering this 
question.  The role of the economist he thought was to consider whether the necessary resources 
would be available and how they might be combined most efficiently to achieve the given end.  
But what was the end?  Marshall argued that measuring equality was not about a simple 
quantitative assessment in terms of goods and services but involved: µa qualitative assessment 
of life as a whole in terms of the essential elements LQFLYLOL]DWLRQRUFXOWXUH¶,QWKDWOLJKWKH
understood Alfred Marshall to be: 
µWDNLQJ DV WKH VWDQdard of civilised life the conditions regarded by his generation as 
appropriate to a gentleman. We can go on to say that the claim of all to enjoy these 
conditions is a claim to be admitted to a share in the social heritage, which in turn means 
a claim to be accepted as full members of the VRFLHW\WKDWLVDVFLWL]HQV¶0DUVKDOO, 
pp.7-8). 
The famous account of the development of the civil, political and social rights of citizenship 
which followed identifies what Marshall considered had become accepted as the elements of a 
civilised life in Britain by the middle of the twentieth century.  The overview discussed 
education, legal aid, health education, pensions, housing, social insurance, with the main 
emphases being the way social rights in these areas represent µDQLQYDVLRQRIFRQWUDFWE\VWDWXV¶; 
and the impact of this public provision in reducing the social significance of income 
inequalities. 
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For our purposes it is notable that throughout this discussion Marshall makes the case for 
the social rights of citizenship in sociological terms with virtually no reference to their impact 
on the economy - either productive or counterproductive.  But in the conclusion he returns to 
$OIUHG 0DUVKDOO¶V SURSRVLWLRQ WKDW DQ\ LQWHUYHQWLRQ WR FLYLOLVH WKH µworking man¶ must not 
interfere with the freedom of the market.  And he notes that another economist, Lionel Robbins, 
KDGUHFHQWO\GHFODUHGDWWHPSWVWRµUXQDQHJDOLWDULDQUHDl income system side by side with an 
inegalitarian money income system [were]« VRPHZKDW simpliste¶  Marshall (1950, p.84) 
responded in kind, finding 5REELQV¶ µORJLFRIWKHPDUNHW¶LQDSSOLFDEOHLQWKHUHDOZRUOGDQG
needing to be tempered by the realism of WKHVRFLRORJLVWµZKRUHPHPEHUVWKDWVRFLDOEHKDYLRXU
is not governed by logic, and that a human society can make a square meal out of a stew of 
SDUDGR[«¶. 
The certain antipathy to economics expressed here probably reflects a context in which the 
full poliWLFDOHIIHFWVRIWKHµ.H\QHVLDQVHWWOHPHQW¶DQGµHQGRILGHRORJ\¶ZHUHQRW\HWPDQLIHVW 
But it is notable that even the younger more radical Marshall emphasised the importance of a 
strong market based economy as a basis for and complement to social rights.  The late 
nineteenth century surge in social reform, he noted, had been enabled in part by a widespread 
rise of money incomes and spread of mass production which helped reduce the social gap 
between the classes.  This positive valuation of the market economy became more pronounced 
over time.  Thus Marshall (1981, p.135) GHFODUHGWKDWµ,DPRQHRIWKRVHZKREHOLHYHWKDWLWLV
hardly possible to maintain democratic freedoms in a society which does not contain a large 
area of economic freedom and that the incentives provided by and expressed in competitive 
markets make a contribution to efficiency and to progress in the production and distribution of 
ZHDOWKZKLFKFDQQRW«EHGHULYHGIURPDQ\RWKHUVRXUFH¶ 
Later in the very first issue of the Journal of Social Policy and a subsequent commentary, 
Marshall (1972, 1981) DGGUHVVHGPRUHIXOO\WKDWµVWHZRISDUDGR[¶LGHQWLILHGDERYHThese 
writings reflect a very different context.  Thus Marshall writes of a world in which the early 
post-war socialist aspirations for a centrally owned and planned economy represented by the 
work of the economist Evan Durbin had given way to what he called the µhyphenated society¶: 
democratic-welfare-capitalism.  In it were three distinct but interdependent spheres.  Each of 
µWKHVHFWRUV¶ Marshall (1981, p.125-6) VDLGVKRXOGµenjoy a measure of autonomy derived from 
WKHSRZHULQKHUHQWLQWKHLUD[LDOSULQFLSOHV«[each] can invoke an authority independent of, 
and arguably equal in status to, those invoked for the other twR¶  One sphere was the market. 
Second was the welfare sector which was needed because µWKHPDUNHWYDOXHRIDQLQGLYLGXDO
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cannot be the measure of his [her] ULJKW WRZHOIDUH¶ LQ D welfare state which assigns every 
citizen equal value.  And third was the political arena of democratic government.  Each being 
organised on a different axial principle required different modes of organisation to achieve 
their respective goals. While the distinctions between the sectors can sometimes be obscured 
in practice Marshall (1981, pp.124-125) warns against blurring the differences: 
µWKH K\SKHQ OLQNV«GLIIHUHQW DQG FRQWUDVWHG HOHPHQWV WRJHWKHU WR FUHDWH D QHZ HQWLW\
whose character is the product of the combination, but not the fusion, of the components, 
whose VHSDUDWHLGHQWLWLHVDUHSUHVHUYHGLQWDFWDQGDUHRIHTXDOFRQWULEXWRU\VWDWXV«7KH
WLHLVXQEUHDNDEOHH[FHSWE\WKHGHVWUXFWLRQRUGHJUDGDWLRQRIRQHRIWKHSDUWQHUV«¶ 
Marshall¶V analysis of the interaction of welfare and economy was more or less entirely 
concerned with distributional effects, namely the way in which market inequalities are or are 
not offset by welfare.  In the later reflection on the hyphenated society he chose to substitute 
WKH µPL[HG HFRQRP\¶ IRU µFDSLWDOLVP¶ RU µWKH PDUNHW¶ and gestured towards an idea of it 
ZRUNLQJLQDFRPSOHPHQWDU\ZD\ZLWKWKHZHOIDUHV\VWHPWRPHHWSHRSOH¶VZDQWVDQGQHHGV
But he pulOVXSVKRUWRQDQ\GLVFXVVLRQRIKRZWKHµDQWL-social elements in tKHFDSLWDOLVWPDUNHW¶
PLJKWEHWDFNOHGWKURXJKµDFWLRQZLWKLQWKHHFRQRP\LWVHOI¶ (Marshall 1981, p.123-135).  What 
is notable here is the absence of any mention of Keynes or Keynesian economics, or even full 
employment in this rather tentative discussion RIWKHµPL[HGHFRQRP\¶ Given that Beveridge 
himself - whom Marshall portrays as a founder of the British welfare estate ± wrote so 
HPSKDWLFDOO\DERXWIXOOHPSOR\PHQWDVWKHIRXQGDWLRQRIWKHIUHHVRFLHW\WKLVJDSLQ0DUVKDOO¶V
thinking is surprising. 
If there was a blind spot in 0DUVKDOO¶VVFKHPDtowards the kinds of economic interventions 
needed to eradicate the anti-social aspects of the market economy there was also an absence of 
understanding of the productivist value of welfare policy.  This is very apparent when set side 
by side with the Swedish understanding of productivist social policy as it was summarised by 
Myrdal (1972) in the very same first issue of the Journal of Social Policy.  Classical and 
neoclassical economics had tended, he said, to DVVXPHµDFRQIOLFWEHWZHHQHFRQRPLFJURZWK
DQGHJDOLWDULDQUHIRUPV¶ (p.5).  With the development of welfare states, the idea emerged that 
welfare systems instead of being costly for a society were actually laying a basis for more 
steady and rapid economic growth.  In 6ZHGHQLQWKHVWKHLGHDRIVRFLDOSROLFLHVDVµDQ
LQYHVWPHQWLQSURJUHVV¶KDGIRFXVVHG on what he called preventativeRUµprophylactic¶SROLF\
designed to save individuals and families from future costs and/or increasing their productivity 
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(p.6).  Productive social policies in this sense could include housing, health, education, 
nutrition, supporting people with disabilities, treating young offenders and income 
redistribution even including old age pensions as families no longer had the time to care for 
the aged without serious financial penalties.  (PSKDVLVLQJ WKHVH µSURGXFWLYLW\ HIIHFWV RI
FRQVXPSWLRQ¶0\UGDOH[SODLQHGKRZDQHDUOLHUUHIRUPHPSKDVLVLQ6ZHGHQRQWKHVRFLDOL]DWLRQ
of major industry and finance KDGVZLWFKHGLQWKHVWRWKHµVRFLDOLVDWLRQRIFRQVXPSWLRQ¶
At the same time, he emphasised that economic success was not simply a result of productivist 
welfare but a complementary array of economic policies including, full employment, free trade, 
and labour market regulation. 
7RGD\ZHGRVHHVLJQLILFDQWLQWHUHVWLQ0DUVKDOO¶VZRUNIRUWKRVHVHHNLQJWRUHFRQVWUXFWD
middle way agenda after the extremes of left and right.  Thus Evers and Guillemard (2012) 
show how citizenship rights can be understood to include social investments in capabilities.  
While Margaret Somers (2008) µWULDGLF¶DSSURDFKWRWKHUHQHZDORIFLWL]HQVKLSKLJKOLJKWVWKH
continuing relevance of recognising the distinctive contributions of market, state and civil 
society.  Nevertheless, Marshall¶V IUDPHZRUN showed little understanding of the productive 
importance of welfare as discussed here by Myrdal and expanded later by 2¶&RQQRUDQGRWKHUV  
Nor did he show any detailed understanding of the kinds of social interventions in the economy 
which might be needed to complement the welfare system if capitalism was indeed to be 
civilised.  Still, the Marshallian legacy of non-productivist welfare thinkers (see Midgley 2015) 
is perhaps overstated, for he actually took account of the importance of a well-functioning 
economy in his work, particularly the later Marshall who pursued the LGHD RI WKH µPL[HG
HFRQRP\¶ of welfare and, as Titmuss observes in his introduction to Equality, Marshall 
certainly believed in democratic socialist objectives such as inclusive growth and prosperity, 
µin which all are promised a share by WKHPDUNHW¶7DZQH\S.  Although Marshall 
never explicitly clarified his change of views, he was certainly thinking in terms of a Keynesian 
mix of state and markets where state or social intervention in the economy (not just social 
welfare policy) was seen as important in improving economic performance and removing the 
anti-social tendencies of mass unemployment and poverty.  In his later writings he was very 
cognizant of the contingent nature of the regime partly because of the contradictory roles 
DVVLJQHGWRLQHTXDOLW\LQWKHµHFRQRP\¶DQGLQWKHµZHOIDUH¶VSKHUHV Indeed, we have seen 
how the centre did not hold and social policy was reframed in the radicalism of left and right 
ideology. 
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R. H. Tawney on social investment 
,W LV VLJQLILFDQW WKDW FRQWHPSRUDULHV FRQWLQXH WR VHH YDOXH LQ 0DUVKDOO¶V µWULDGLF¶ DSSURDFK
From the age of radicalism social policy was largely constructed within a no compromise 
contest of state versus market.  But the idea of social investment demands positive roles of both 
state and the market.  Perhaps the Cold War culture encouraged the polarisation of the radical 
years (see Petersen, 2013), but it is striking that when we look to the century or so which 
preceded the welfare state it was a state and market approach which was more the norm.  There 
is a large literature on this, ZKHWKHUZHORRNWRµQHZOLEHUDOLVP¶IURP7. H. Green or to Keynes 
or the varieties of socialism from Fabianism to Christian socialism, to guild socialism and so 
on we see this to be the case.  Probably the most influential and best known exemplar for 
present day champions of a triadic approach is Karl Polanyi with his idea of overcoming the 
commodification of land, labour and money through the re-embedding of the market in society 
(see Holmwood 2000; Block and Sommers 2014; Glasman 1996; Streeck 2014).  Here we 
highlight the work of R. H. Tawney.  Perhaps the most representative British figure of the 
interwar period, KLVLGHDVDUHµRZQHG¶QRWRQO\E\DOOVLGHVRIWKH%ULWLVKOHIW, but as Freeden 
(1986) writes, also the new liberals (Clift and Tomlinson 2002).  A figure of such influence 
has naturally generated numerous biographies and not without scholarly controversy.  Broadly 
speaking these differences relate very much as WR KRZSHRSOH µSODFH¶ 7DZQH\¶VSROLWLFV LQ
relation to differences between liberals and socialists in the period; and also within socialism 
itself as between Fabian planning and more decentralised versions of a socialist economy 
(Terrill 1973; Greenleaf 1983; Wright 1987; Goldman 2013).  This complexity lies beyond this 
article.  Rather we highlight general features of his work which offer us a window into a period 
in the development of social policy when welfare issues were but one arm of social 
interventions designed to harness markets in the service of equality and freedom. 
Part of 7DZQH\¶V protean appeal was his eschewal of grand theory.  His major work of 
economic history, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (1937), for example, was well informed 
by the sociology of Weber and the political economy of Marx but not contained by them.  In 
the manner of Polanyi, the history shows the rise of the market economy undoing the ethical 
foundations and institutions of the medieval economy with the market promoted as a natural 
law to which society must submit.  All commentary stresses the way in which Tawney¶s 
interpretation was grounded in a Christian ethics.  His best known works, The Acquisitive 
Society and Equality present thiVµHWKLFDOVRFLDOLVW¶ view of how markets might contribute to a 
society based on values of equality and freedom. 
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Tawney (1982, p.23) aligned his values with µWKH JUHDW LQGLYLGXDOLVWV RI WKH HLJKWHHQWK
century, Jefferson and Turgot and Condorcet and Adam Smith« Whose ideal was a society 
where each man had free access to the economic opportunities which he could use and enjoy 
the wealth which by his efforts he had created¶+HDOVRHPSKDVLVHGfellowship RUWKHµFRPPRQ
KXPDQLW\¶ZKLFKLQGLYLGXDOVVKDUH, requiring a society which pursues equality to the extent 
that GLIIHUHQFHVRIµFKDUDFWHUDQGLQWHOOLJHQFH¶IDURXWZHLJKµHFRQRPLFDQGVRFLDOGLIIHUHQFHV
between GLIIHUHQWJURXSV¶As important as equality was to Tawney, in the end it needed to 
serve the freedom of individuals to become the best of which they are capable.  Achieving such 
a society of equals meant a strategy to end unearned privilege and µWKHconversion of economic 
power, now often an irresponsible tyrant into the servant of society, working within clearly 
defined limits and accountable for its actions to a public authority¶7DZQH\ p.15). 
In this pre-welfare state world, social and economic policy were not organised into separate 
divisions.  Eliminating the antisocial elements of capitalism meant primarily social intervention 
in the economy but supported by welfare in the narrow sense of taxes and transfers.  Thus 
Tawney framed his strategy for equality in terms of the transition from an µDcquisitive society¶ 
to one based on social function.  Industries would no longer be organised mainly around 
individual financial gain but around the service they performed to society.  Unlike some 
Fabians, Tawney did not think this automatically translated into nationalisation (which may or 
may not be efficient) and centralised economic planning.  Some parts of the economy presented 
as more suited to public ownership (e.g. utilities than others, such as luxury goods).  Indeed, 
as Clift and Tomlinson (2002) write, Tawney had important but neglected ideas on how to 
assist the private sector to fulfil public functions - what we might call corporate social 
responsibility.  He also emphasised the importance of trade unions for greater economic 
democracy, industrial regulation in reducing inequality; and the development of machinery to 
ensure that µthe larger questions of economic strategy and industrial organization are treated as 
« D SXEOLF FRQFHUQ DQG WKDW WKRVH ZKR GHFLGH WKHP « EH DFFRXQWDEOH WR WKH SXEOLF«¶ 
(Tawney 1952, p.194). 
The strategic role of social services and progressive taxation was to help redress the 
disparities of opportunity created by inequality.  Tawney (1952, p.169) held strong views of 
the productive value of this social investment: 
µ,QUHDOLW\RIFRXUVHWKHJUHDWHUSDUWRIWKHH[SHQGLWXUHXSRQWKHVRFLDOVHUYLFHVLVQRWD
liability but an investment, the dividends of which are not the less substantial because they 
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are paid, not in cash, but in strengthened individual energies and an increased capacity for 
FRRSHUDWLYHHIIRUW«¶ 
7DZQH\¶VLGHDVwere known to Swedish Social Democrats at the time (Andersson 2007) and 
shared that same understanding of social services as both consumption and investment found 
in Myrdal (1972); and later, among thinkers on left in the 1970s.  Further, while Tawney has 
been associated with the revival of pro-market elements of WKH%ULWLVKµWKLUGZD\¶KHZDVQR
DGYRFDWHRIWKHNLQGRIµVRFLDOLQYHVWPHQWSOXVIUHHPDUNHWV¶WKDWSHRSOHOLNH1RODQDVVRFLDWH
with that period (Tomlinson 2002; Clift and Tomlinson 2002).  Taxes and transfers, for Tawney 
were but one part of a larger economic strategy to eliminate the antisocial inequalities of power 
and resources found in market society.  The heavy lifting was to be done through a mix of 
economic ownership, public regulation and planning together with professional associations 
all geared toward public service in a society of equals. 
 
Conclusion and discussion 
To help mark the Social Policy and Administration 50th Anniversary Conference, this long 
durée perspective has attempted to trace and revive some of the early traditions of social 
investment social policy thinking within the discipline. It began with our curiosity about its 
popularity as a political programme associated ZLWKµWKLUGZD\¶thinking at the turn of the last 
century on the one hand but its struggle to develop as a theoretical paradigm on the other hand.  
The struggle was reflected in the suspicion among some social policy researchers of a 
subordination of the social to neoliberalism while supporters struggled with the absence of a 
FRPSDWLEOHµQHZHFRQRPLFPRGHO¶7KHYery novelty of the idea suggested a certain lack of 
intellectual weight.  So we set out to build upon the few suggestions in the literature that social 
investment might have a stronger policy pedigree than had been otherwise assumed. 
We picked up the threads of social policy as investment in the 1970s and 1980s.  New Left 
Marxists were seen to have had a comprehensive theory of social investment based on 
accumulation and legitimation and with the small proportion of social policies aimed mainly 
at protection merging into those where consumption was also highly oriented to production 
and, finally into those social investments which were focussed on the provision of an economic 
infrastructure to promote greater accumulation. Conceptualised within a radical political 
economy framework which looked to the end of private property and the market economy, this 
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understanding of social investment simply disappeared from social policy with the triumph of 
the radical right in the 1980s and 1990s.  Today ± albeit recast in terms of contemporary 
political economy - it remains important as an exemplar of the kind of schematic policy 
classLILFDWLRQQHHGHGLIZHDUHWRUHLQWHJUDWHWRGD\¶VUHVWULFWHGFDWHJRULVDWLRQRIVRFLDOSROLF\
in terms of social protection with one encompassing its productivist functions. 
In the preceding period we explored the way in which, as T. H. Marshall (1981, p.129) 
KLPVHOIZURWH WKHEURDG µKROLVWLF LGHDRI WKHZHOIDUH VWDWH¶ZKLFKKDG VKDSHG WKH.H\QHV-
%HYHULGJHSHULRGEHFDPHµLGHQWLILHGZLWKWKDWSDUWLFXODUOLPLWHGVSKHUHRISXEOLFDIIDLUVZKLFK
ZH FDOO VRFLDO SROLF\¶  $V ROG LGHRORJLFDO EDWWOH OLQHV FROODSVHG the relationship between 
HFRQRPLFDQGVRFLDOSROLF\EHFDPHIRU0DUVKDOODµVWHZRISDUDGR[¶:KLOHKHKDGOLWWOHVHQVH
of the productive value of social consumption, the later Marshall gestured strongly towards the 
idea that a focus on social protection alone would never suffice. Hence the importance he came 
WR DWWDFK WR WKH µPL[HG HFRQRP\¶ DV SDUWQHU WR WKH ZHOIDUH VWDWH LQ WDFNOLQJ WKH DQWL-social 
HOHPHQWVRIWKHPDUNHWHFRQRP\0DUVKDOO¶VHQGXULQJVLJQLILFDQFHLVWRSRLQWRXWWKDWLIZH
want social policy models which unite an emphasis on market freedoms with social equality 
then we need a renewal of a triadic policy regime which respects the different roles required of 
state, market and civil society. 
In the work of R. H. Tawney we encounter that broad holistic thinking about social and 
economic policy overshadowed in the immediate post-war period.  As with the later New Left 
we have a full understanding of the interdependencies of economic and social policy and of the 
productive value of social consumption in any strategy for equality.  But unlike the New Left 
and more like Marshall the policy regime is not cast upon a radical incompatibility of state and 
market (cf. Esping-Andersen 1985).  It suggests the need for rethinking social policy regimes 
EDVHGQRWRQWKHUDGLFDOFRQWHVWRIµSROLWLFVDJDLQVWPDUNHWV¶EXWRQDQHZemerging middle 
ground, a symbiotic relationship RIµpolitics and markets¶WKDWTawney appeared to recognise 
as essential for economic growth (what Iversen and Soskice have recently described as (2015) 
as µSROLWLFV IRU PDUNHWV¶)  7DZQH\¶V SUH-welfare state analysis, along with that of Polanyi 
provide starting points for building social policy models which can re-balance the roles of state, 
market and civil society in a social investment framework. 
From a long durée perspective then we find that far from an early twentieth century novelty 
the idea of social investment has always been a foundational idea in social policy.  Indeed, we 
see present day interpretations of the social investment perspective being rather narrowly 
18 
 
focused on equipping and preparing individuals for their participation in the market economy 
(Hemerijck 2017, forthcoming; Midgley 2017, forthcoming), neglecting the µPL[HG¶ economy 
as a whole and whether it is working for everybody (Deeming and Smyth 2017, forthcoming).  
We are also able to trace the current amnesia about social investment to the impact of the age 
of radicalism in social policy ZKHQWKHOHIWJDYHXSRQWKHµPL[HGHFRQRP\¶DQGQHROLEHUDOV
began their crusade against the state. Today as the international economic community shifts 
into a more pragmatic mode this social policy history suggests the kinds of policies and 
principles which need to be back on the table to in order to tackle social inequality generated 
by markets and end what Paul Pierson has termeGWKHHUDRIµSHUPDQHQWDXVWHULW\¶LQ:HVWHUQ
Democracies (Pierson 2001). 
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